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Abstract
This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can
overcome its asymmetric information problem by selling via a reputable downstream
rm. The suppliers adverse-selection problem can be solved if the downstream rm
has established a reputation for delivering high quality vis-à-vis the supplier. The
supplier may enter the market by initially renting the downstream rms reputation.
The downstream rm may optimally source its input externally, even though sourcing
internally would be better in terms of productive e¢ ciency. Since an entrant in the
downstream market may lack reputation, it may su¤er from a reputational barrier to
entry arising from higher input costs.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores a mechanism through which a reputable downstream rm can leverage
its reputation to procure its inputs cheaply in the presence of adverse selection among
input suppliers. The paper also analyzes the implications for outsourcing, from-OEM-to-
brand strategy and downstream barriers to entry. To x ideas, consider a supplier whose
product can be sold either directly to consumers or to downstream rms as an input.
However, due to indivisibilities, the supplier cannot use multiple options. The suppliers
capability to produce a high-quality product is unknown to consumers and is subject to
adverse selection. In contrast, we assume that a downstream rm has the ability to ascertain
the quality of its input suppliers. This is a reasonable assumption in that small end users
lack the knowledge and expertise to assess the quality of unknown suppliers products,
while large industrial rms often have su¢ cient expertise to ascertain the quality of their
business partnersproduct quality. Due to asymmetric information when selling directly
to consumers, a high-quality supplier needs to establish a reputation for its quality with a
costly signaling mechanism. For instance, the rm may engage in introductory pricing by
selling the product at a discount directly to end consumers (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).
One possible alternative to build a positive reputation is to sell its product as an input to
a downstream rm when high-quality inputs are essential to maintain the quality of the
downstream-stage product. Due to the necessity of high-quality inputs for a high-quality
downstream product, the quality of the downstream product can be a signal of input quality.
However, this requires that high-quality inputs are converted into high-quality nal products
an ability that a downstream rm does not necessarily possess. A downstream rm that
is known to be of high quality can resolve the asymmetric information problem faced by the
upstream rm, while a downstream rm of unknown ability is less successful to resolve it.
Suppose that the downstream rm is known to be a high-quality producer. This makes
the input supplier a willing partner for the reputable downstream-stage monopolist, as its
supplier relationship can be a signal of its quality, which enables it to charge a full price
commensurate with its quality in the future. Suppose, instead, that the downstream rm
is of unknown capability. In such a case, the input supplier may be unwilling to sell to the
downstream rm even if it o¤ers a higher price than if it were reputable because there
is no assurance that its quality can be signaled if the downstream rm fails to deliver high
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quality.
The signaling mechanism uncovers a novel source of cost advantages for the incumbent
downstream rm, which leads to a novel theory of entry barrier in which an incumbents
reputation serves as a mechanism to procure inputs at a lower cost  even at below the
input suppliersmarginal cost compared to potential entrants. This allows the incumbent
to maintain the incumbency position even if a potential entrant is more e¢ cient, thus
creating a barrier to entry. The incumbents advantage comes from its ability to certify
the quality of input suppliers if they are subject to adverse selection due to uncertainty
about the quality of their products. We show that even if a potential entrant is equally
capable as or more e¢ cient than the incumbent in all aspects, and its own product is not
subject to any quality uncertainty once it is introduced to the market, the entrant may still
be unable to procure inputs as cheaply as the incumbent rm. This holds as long as its
capability is ex ante unknown to the suppliers because, when their own types are unknown,
the suppliers are concerned about the type of the entrant downstream rm.
In contrast to our theory of entry barriers due to supplier concerns, in the existing
literature, reputational entry barriers arise due to consumer uncertainty about the quality
of the product they buy. Schmalensee (1982) and Farrell (1986), for instance, consider
markets for experience goods in which buyers cannot verify the quality of an entrants
goods before actually buying and using them. They show that buyers suspicion about
the quality of an entrants goods serves as an entry barrier due to the "y-by-night" type
entrants incentives to engage in a hit-and-run strategy. As in Schmalensee (1982) and
Farrell (1986), most of the papers on this topic assume that the quality of the entrants
product cannot be ascertained because it is an experience good. In contrast, we assume that
the potential entrant is not subject to informational imperfection vis-à-vis consumers. In
our model, the entrants disadvantage is the inability to convince potential input suppliers of
its capability when the input suppliers themselves need to establish a positive reputation. In
a typical setting in which a product is sold to end consumers, the sellers care only about the
price they receive, and the buyerstype is of no concern to the sellers (whereas buyers may
be concerned with the sellerstypes). In our model, the success of the downstream market
product can be a signal of the input suppliersquality, and the input suppliers are concerned
with the buyerstype when their own reputations are at stake. The informational problem
at hand is the input suppliersex ante assessment of the downstream-stage entrants quality,
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not the buyersassessment.
This paper is closely related to the strand of literature that studies how reputable retail-
ers can use reputation capital to vouch for an upstream partners quality and, thus, mitigate
the adverse-selection problem. Chu and Chu (1994), for example, show how suppliers of
high-quality products can use retailersreputation to signal their quality, whereas suppli-
ers of low-quality products distribute through discounters with no reputation. In a similar
vein, Biglaiser (1993) explores the role of middlemen in a market as agents to solve the
adverse-selection problem; see, also, Biglaiser and Friedman (1994). Alternatively, imper-
fect competition between upstream products can resolve adverse-selection and moral-hazard
problems through the use of a common intermediary or a shared distribution channel (see
Garella and Peitz, 2000 and 2007). Choi and Jeon (2007) develop a theory of co-branding as
a mechanism to leverage one rms reputation with another. They show that under certain
conditions, co-branding that links unknown rms in a new sector with established rms in
a mature sector allows the unknown rms to signal a high product quality and establish
their own reputations. The literature on umbrella branding (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988; Choi,
1998; Cabral, 2000; and Hakenes and Peitz, 2008) develops a related idea. It investigates
how a rm leverages its reputation capital with an existing product to signal the quality of
its own new products, rather than "renting" its capital to other rms. Our model expands
on these ideas and investigates how a reputable downstream rm can "certify" unknown
input suppliers. It can use this leverage to procure inputs at a lower cost, as suppliers are
willing to sell at a lower price in return for the reputation boost. The signaling mechanism
sheds new light on outsourcing decisions and dynamic brand development strategies for new
rms.
In our model, the reputable downstream rm plays the dual role of input purchaser
cum "certication intermediary." In this sense, this paper is related to Lizzeri (1999) and
Albano and Lizzeri (2001). Lizzeri (1991) analyzes the role of certication intermediaries
in a model of adverse selection. He focuses on the strategic manipulation of information by
certication intermediaries and shows that the optimal choice for the intermediaries often
entails no disclosure or partial closure in the form of minimum quality certication. Albano
and Lizzeri (2001) extend Lizzeris (1999) analysis to investigate the e¤ects of a certication
intermediary on the sellersincentives to produce quality goods. They analyze the issue of
the optimal degree of information revelation and show that the presence of an intermediary
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enhances e¢ ciency by increasing the sellersincentives to provide high quality, even though
the quality is underprovided in equilibrium relative to the full information rst best. In
their analysis of the role of intermediaries, they assume that the intermediary can credibly
commit to a disclosure rule to maximize its prots. In a sense, the downstream rm in our
model can more credibily to certify quality because its own retail prots are at stake.
Johnson (2012) develops a related idea in the context of exclusive dealing based on a
similar informational structure. In particular, he assumes that retailers are in a better
position than consumers to ascertain the quality of a new product. He shows that the
upstream incumbent may prot from a partially exclusionary dealing policy that contracts
with only high-reputation retailers. Essentially, the contract blocks the channel that a
potential entrant may use to signal its quality. We similarly assume that downstream rms
information about trading partners is superior to consumers. However, the mechanism at
work in our model is very di¤erent from Johnsons. In Johnsons model, partial exclusion is
an entry-deterring strategy utilized by the upstream incumbent to deny a potential entrant
access to the reputation capital of downstream retailers. In contrast, our model focuses on
the disadvantage faced by a potential downstream entrant, which arises from the upstream
rmsuncertainty about the capability of the entrant and their reluctance to supply the
entrant when their reputations are at stake.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a basic model of
adverse selection in which a rm of unknown quality can sell only directly to consumers.
In Section 3, we introduce a second distribution channel that can be used to signal quality.
Thus, the rm can sell its product to consumers directly with introductory pricing or to a
reputable downstream rm, which it then uses as an input. We show that the downstream
rm can use its reputation to resolve the sellers asymmetric information problem and to
extract rents from the seller. Section 4 explores other contexts to which the mechanism
developed in the paper can be applied. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries: The Adverse Selection Problem of Sellers
2.1 The adverse selection problem
We base our analysis on a simple model of adverse selection with an experience good in
which the quality of the product is initially the sellersprivate information. We consider
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a two-period model in which the quality of the product is revealed at the end of the rst
period, once it is consumed. The quality of the product can be high or low. There are
two types of sellers, the high type and the low type. High-type sellers are endowed with
the ability to produce a high-quality product, while low-type sellers can produce only a
low-quality product. Consumers are homogeneous and have unit demand. Their valuation
is  for high quality and 0 for low quality.
The measure of sellers is set equal to 1, while the measure of consumers is strictly greater
than 1; this implies that there is some unmet demand. Since we assume that each seller can
produce only one unit in each period, this implies that there is demand for potentially all
the production. A fraction  2 (0; 1) of sellers is of the high type. The discount factor is .
A high-type seller has a production cost of cH whereas a low-type seller has a production
cost of cL with cH > cL. The higher cost for a high-quality product can represent either a
production cost di¤erence or an opportunity cost di¤erence, as, for instance, in Daughety
and Reinganum (2005). Regarding the opportunity cost interpretation, all types of sellers
have the same production cost of cL, but the high type has an option value at cH , which
represents the value of an alternative use for the product, such as keeping the product (as
in Akerlof, 1970). Consumers derive the value  from the consumption of a high-quality
product. We assume that there are positive gains from trade for the high-quality product;
i.e.,  > cH . A low-quality seller will not be active under full information, as the value of
the product is assumed to be zero when the quality is low.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, sellers privately learn their type. In period
1, they set the period-1 price. Consumers observe the period-1 price and update their
beliefs about product quality. Then, they make their purchase decision. After purchase,
all consumers observe product quality. In period 2, sellers set the period-2 price. Then,
consumers make their purchase decision. Depending on the parameter values, we can have
di¤erent market equilibria (we consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria throughout this paper).
In period 2, when the quality of the product is high and consumers are informed of its
quality, a seller can command a price of . A high-quality seller then makes prot    cH .
Under asymmetric information about product quality in period 1, we can have three types of
market equilibria depending on parameter values. As the high-type seller is more protable
than the low-type seller in the second period, a sacrice of prots by introductory pricing
or dissipative advertising can be a signal to buyers that quality is high (see, e.g., Milgrom
5
and Roberts, 1986). In such a case, we have a separating equilibrium. In addition, we can
also have a pooling equilibrium in which both types of sellers charge the same price, or the
market breaks down since it cannot overcome the adverse-selection problem.
2.2 Separating equilibrium
Consider a separating equilibrium in which introductory pricing can reveal each sellers type
in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the high type needs to charge a price weakly less
than cL to signal that its quality is high and to deter the low types incentives to mimic.
The highest such price is p1 = cL. In the second period, consumers know its quality, and
the high type can command a price of . Overall prot is
H = (p1   cH) + (   cH) =  (cH   cL) + (   cH):
For a separating equilibrium to exist, therefore, we need the following individual rationality
condition for the high type:
(   cH)  cH   cL (1)
The high-type rm makes a loss of (cH   cL) in the rst period to signal its quality with
an introductory pricing, which needs to be made up by the future prot when its quality
is revealed. The condition says that the high-type rms second-period prot is su¢ ciently
high to recoup the rst-period loss. In the separating equilibrium, only the high-quality
product is sold in both periods, and the low-quality rm is unable to sell. If the separating
equilibrium exists, it is also e¢ cient.
2.3 Pooling and semi-separating equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium or in a game in which consumers bid up the price, no signaling
through price takes place. In equilibrium, both types of rms sell in the market, and
consumers cannot distinguish one from another before consuming the product. Consumers
are willing to pay only up to the expected value of the product, which is given by p1 = .
In the second period, the quality is revealed, with the high-quality rm commanding a price
of  and the low-quality rm exiting the market. Overall prot for the high-quality rm is
H = (   cH) + (   cH):
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For a pooling equilibrium to exist, we need two conditions:
p1 =   cL (2)
(   cH) + (   cH)  0: (3)
The rst condition above is the individual rationality condition for the low type, and the
second condition is for the high type.1 When pooling and separating equilibria co-exist, the
former always gives higher prots to either type of the seller than the latter.
If condition (2) is not satised and (3) is, then there is a semi-separating equilibrium in
which the market price of the input is cL, with the low-type rm selling with a probability
of (   cL)=[(1   )cL] and the high-type rm always selling. The high-type rm makes
prot  (cH   cL) + (   cH), which is the same as in a separating equilibrium.
2.4 Market collapse with no trade
If high-type rms cannot overcome the adverse-selection problem in the market, there is no
trade. This would be the case if the production cost of the high-quality product is close to
the value of the product , relatively large compared to cL, and the probability of the high
type, , is low. More precisely,
(   cH) < (cH   cL) and  <  = cL

: (4)
2.5 Maximal prot of high-quality seller
When there are multiple equilibria for a given parameter constellation, we focus on the
Pareto-superior equilibrium for the sellers. In this equilibrium, the prot of high-quality
sellers is given by
direct 
8>>><>>>:
(   cH) + (   cH) if   cL and (+ )  (1 + )cH
 (cH   cL) + (   cH) if  < cL and cL +   (1 + )cH
0 else
(5)
1 If cH = cL = c, the condition for the high type is automatically satised if the condition for the low
type holds.
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Thus, in an extended setting in which a seller has access to an alternative sales channel,
direct constitutes the maximal value of the outside option to that alternative channel.
3 Selling through a downstream rmwith reputational lever-
age
3.1 Setting
We introduce another channel through which a seller can sell its product. More specically,
we assume that the product can also be used as an input to a downstream rm. The seller
cannot serve the consumer market and a downstream rm at the same time; this assumption
is obviously satised with a single unit to be sold in each period. More generally, the
rationale for this assumption is that the production of an input for a particular downstream
rm requires its customization to t the exact specications of the nal product for which
it is designed.2 Alternatively, due to contractual reasons, the downstream rm may not
allow the seller to use multiple channels.3
We make an important assumption about the informational structure of the game; unlike
consumers, the downstream rm can ascertain the quality of the product when it is used
as an input.4 This is a reasonable assumption because the downstream rm may be a large
enterprise and have enough expertise to evaluate the product, unlike less sophisticated
consumers.
The downstream rm either contracts with a seller to supply the input or obtains it
from an independent source at the cost of . Two interpretations of such an independent
source are (i) provision by an established high-quality input provider o¤ering the input at
the market price of  (implying that  = ); or (ii) in-house provision at an opportunity
cost  (see, also, Section 4.2). The downstream rm can also be of two types.
The quality of the downstream product is either high or low.5 There is complementarity
between the input quality and the downstream rms product quality. In particular, a high-
2We assume that customization can be adjusted in each period and does not a¤ect the quality of the
product.
3We can extend this to allow for multiple channels. In this case, in addition to the input price, which is
linear in quantity, a xed fee would need to be introduced to replicate our results.
4As we will show below, our main argument does not completely break down when the downstream rm
is not an expert and cannot identify the suppliers type.
5The downstream rm may also be a provider of a service that uses the suppliers product as an input.
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quality input is essential to ensure high quality of the downstream rms product: regardless
of the downstream rms type, if the input quality is low, the downstream product quality
is also low and has a value of zero. Thus, a high-quality input is a necessary condition
for a high-quality downstream product. If the input quality is high, it is certain that the
high-type downstream rm can produce a high-quality product that has a value of   .
Then, selling through a reputable downstream rm, which is known to be of the high type,
provides another channel to signal the input quality.
We postulate that the high-type downstream rm is always active, which is implied by
 >  + C, where C is the marginal cost of the high-quality downstream rm. However,
if the downstream rms type is low, it can produce a high-quality product with only a
probability of  2 (0; 1), even though the input is of high quality. The idea here is that a
low-quality downstream rm endangers the proper functioning of the sellers product. This
implies that, when the downstream product turns out to be of high quality, the input must
be of high quality. Selling through a low-quality downstream rm carries the risk that the
sellers high-quality product does not work properly, which prevents the seller from reaping
the benets of its high-quality product in the second period.
3.2 Reputation leverage using a reputable downstream rm
In this subsection, we consider the situation in which the downstream rm is known to be
of the high type and analyze how the reputation of the downstream rm can be used as a
mechanism to signal the suppliers quality. The timing of events is as follows. In the rst
period, rst, the sellers privately learn their type; the downstream rms type is publicly
known (reputable downstream rm). The downstream rm observes the sellers quality,
but consumers do not. Second, the downstream rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the
seller it considers contracting with. Third, the seller may either sell directly to consumers,
in which case it sets the retail price and the product is an experience good, or sell the
product as an input to the downstream rm, in which case the downstream rms sets the
retail price. Fourth, consumers buying from the downstream rm observe the price and
the quality of the nal product, and update their belief about input quality based on this
observation. In the second period, the seller again has the choice to sell directly or via the
downstream rm. However, we can discard the latter option since, under full information,
the seller cannot lose from selling directly.
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For now, we just assume that the high-type downstream rm always makes a high-quality
product with the purchase of high-quality input. This could be due to high reputation costs
of the downstream rm, which makes a deviation to low-quality product provision unprof-
itable; or it could be because the downstream product is an inspection good, which makes
selling a low-quality good infeasible. Then, the high-type seller knows that by supplying to
the high-type downstream rm, it can signal its quality to consumers and, thus, command
a price of  in the second period. This implies that the high-quality seller is willing to
supply to the reputable downstream rm whenever its prot is higher or equal to the prot
it would make under direct selling; that is, (pR   cH) + (   cH)  direct, where pR is
the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the reputable downstream rm and direct is given by (5). If
pR < , this alternative signaling mechanism also implies that the downstream rm with a
reputation is able to (and will) purchase the high-quality input at the price of pR due to its
ability to certify the quality of the input.
Note that, for simplicity, we focus on the case in which the possibility of selling through a
downstream rm does not have a feedback e¤ect on consumersinference process about the
composition of the sellerstypes. This would be the case if the measure of the downstream
rms were negligible compared to the measure of the suppliers; however, our argument easily
generalizes to any fraction of high-type sellers disappearing from the direct sales channel,
as discussed below.
We summarize our nding in the following proposition.6
Proposition 1 If (   cH) + (   cH)  direct, in any equilibrium, the seller sells the
input to the reputable downstream rm in the rst period. It sells at price pR <  in the
rst period and sells directly at price  in the second period.
When the market for direct selling to consumers is characterized by pooling or separating
equilibria, the condition in the proposition above can be written as   p1 = max[; cL]:
In the case of market collapse, the condition can be written as   cH   (  cH): Clearly,
if  were too low, the downstream rm would not engage the seller upstream, even though
it could obtain a price below the sellers cost. The minimum value of  required for the
6 If the downstream rm cannot make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a chosen high-quality input supplier, but
the downstream rm picks such a supplier and then the two negotiate about the price, as long as negotiations
are successful with positive probability, the chosen input supplier will engage with the downstream rm and
use selling through the downstream rm to resolve its asymmetric information problem under direct selling.
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seller to use an alternative signaling channel of a reputable downstream rm depends on
the equilibrium played in the subgame under direct selling. If seller types pool under direct
selling, we must have    (which must be larger than cL) for the seller to choose
selling through the reputable downstream rm. If this holds, the downstream rm pays
pR =  for the input, which may well be less than cH . If seller types separate or semi-
separate under direct selling, we must have   cL. If this holds, the downstream rm pays
pR = cL for the input, which is denitely less than cH . If the market breaks down under
direct selling, we must have  +   (1   )cH . If this holds, the downstream rm pays
pR = bp1 = cH   (   cH) for the input, which is denitely less than cH .
In other words, when the downstream rm optimally decides not to use its independent
source at cost , the high-quality seller may use the downstream rm as a signaling device
if it pools with the low-quality type under direct selling or if there is market breakdown
under direct selling. It may even do so if it separates under direct selling, albeit at a greater
price discount compared to what it achieves when selling through the downstream rm.
So far, we have restricted the analysis to the case in which the fraction of high-quality
sellers who contract with downstream rms is negligible. Introducing a measure  > 0
of downstream rms implies that the composition of sellers left for direct selling changes.
We assume that downstream rms cater to a di¤erent set of consumers or that consumer
demand is su¢ ciently large to accommodate all potential production; that is, the measure
of consumers exceeds 1 + . Since downstream rms contract with high-quality sellers, the
fraction of high-type sellers left for direct selling decreases from  to (   )=(1   ) for
 <  and 0 otherwise. Thus, it becomes more di¢ cult to sustain pooling among sellers;
for (  )=(1  ) > cL a pooling equilibrium does not exist. Hence, the larger  is, the
less attractive the outside option is for sellers to sell directly. This strengthens our result
about the signaling role of the downstream rm.
We have assumed thus far that the downstream rm observes the quality of the input.
Note, however, that we can dispense with this assumption when the downstream rm makes
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er that a low-quality seller would always reject, but that a high-quality
seller will accept, and gives positive rents for the downstream rm. This is satised for the
prot-maximizing pR if a separating equilibrium is played in the case of direct selling, in
which pR  cL, and, therefore, a low-cost input seller has no incentive to contract with the
downstream rm. Thus, our assumption that the downstream rm is an expert in judging
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the sellers type is essential whenever consumers cannot infer high quality prior to purchase
under direct selling in the rst period  i.e., when the high type does not fully separate
under direct selling.
3.3 Welfare implications from introducing a reputable downstream rm
We explore the welfare implications of the availability of a quality-signaling mechanism
through a supply relationship with a reputable rm, compared to the case in which intro-
ductory pricing is the only way to signal quality. Recall that the downstream rm has an
independent source of its input, which it can procure at the cost of  and which can serve
additional demand. To reduce the number of cases to consider, let us assume that   .
When the inequality is strict, this assumption implies that the most e¢ cient use of the
product we consider is to sell directly (leading to welfare [ C   ] + [  cH ] because the
downstream rm sources at cost ) rather than using it as an input for a downstream rm
(leading to welfare  C   cH). The welfare implications of reputation leverage hinge cru-
cially on the equilibrium that prevails under independent selling i.e., whether the market
collapses due to adverse selection when only introductory pricing is available, or whether
the market survives adverse selection under separating, semi-separating, or pooling. Our
welfare analysis is performed in the base model in which the ratio of downstream rms to
sellers is negligible. This means that we are evaluating the welfare e¤ect of allowing sellers
to sell through downstream rms locally at  = 0. Our analysis can easily be extended to
 > 0, in which case we would need to take consumersinferences into account we address
this case at the end of this subsection.
If the market collapses due to adverse selection, the availability of the alternative signal-
ing mechanism with reputation leverage is unambiguously welfare-enhancing. This would
occur if (4) and the following condition are satised:
bp1 = cH   (   cH) < :
The two inequalities in (4) are the conditions, respectively, for both separating and pool-
ing equilibria to fail to exist, which leads to a market collapse when quality can be signaled
only with the price instrument. The inequality above is the condition that contracting
with the input supplier is more cost-e¤ective for the downstream rm with reputation than
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obtaining the input from the independent source.
With our assumption that   , signaling by supplying to a reputable downstream rm
is welfare-reducing if the market equilibrium is characterized by a separating equilibrium.
The reputable downstream rms input acquisition from an unestablished seller is purely a
rent extraction device that diverts resources from the more productive use. The consumers
are worse o¤ and the downstream rm is better o¤, whereas the seller is indi¤erent when
the downstream rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.7
If the equilibrium with introductory pricing is a pooling one, and reputation leverage
with a downstream rm is also feasible, the welfare e¤ect depends on the details of the
model. With our assumption that the production of the low-quality product is ine¢ cient,
a pooling equilibrium entails ine¢ ciency, which increases with the fraction of low-type
sellers being (1   ). The conditions for there to be a pooling equilibrium are given by
inequalities (2) and (3). In addition, for the reputation leverage mechanism to be e¤ective,
we need  > : Taken together, the condition for a pooling equilibrium to exist and for
the reputation leverage mechanism to apply is given by:
max

cL

;
cH   (   cH)


<  <


:
If the number of downstream rms is negligible compared to the number of sellers, the
use of downstream rms by sellers does not change the composition of suppliers using direct
sales. For a meaningful welfare analysis, the number of downstream rm must, therefore, be
non-negligible. If, in particular, all high-type sellers could sell through downstream rms,
then a supplier who does not supply to a downstream rm would be considered a low-
quality supplier. As a result, the availability of an alternative signaling mechanism would
then eliminate the ine¢ cient production of low-quality products in a pooling equilibrium. To
compare welfare under introductory pricing and reputation leverage, we need only compare
the rst-period social surplus. The total surplus in the rst period with reputation leverage
is given by (  cH), while it is ( )+  [cH+(1 )cL] with independent selling
by input suppliers. Thus, the availability of reputation leverage is welfare-enhancing if and
only if  < b = cL=(    + cL).
7 If we assume that the upstream rm has some bargaining power and the input acquisition price is
negotiated, then both the upstream rm and the downstream rm will be better o¤ at the expense of
consumers.
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3.4 Unknown downstream type and the limits of reputation leverage
So far, we have considered the case of a reputable downstream rm. If the type of a
downstream rm is unknown, the alternative channel to sell to a downstream rm becomes
less attractive for a high-quality seller.
Let  2 (0; 1) be the a priori probability that the downstream rm is of the high type.
Hence, if a high-type seller sells to a non-reputable downstream rm, the nal product
is of higher quality, and the seller can signal its quality with a probability of  =  +
(1   ). Consumers then face the inference problem about whether the bad performance
was caused by the input being high-quality or the downstream rm being of the low type.
We assume that a seller can signal its high quality via its vertical relationship with a
downstream rm only when the downstream rm produces a high quality nal product.
For instance, consumers will not be able to identify sellers for products that no consumers
have bought. Or, alternatively, sellers would not be able to claim the high quality of their
inputs for products that have failed. In other words, we rule out an equilibrium in which
the downstream rms, no matter what their types are, always purchase high-quality input,
and, thus, consumers always attribute the failure of the nal product to the low quality of
the downstream rm.8 Recall that the downstream rm incurs a constant marginal cost of
C.9
We show that there are limits of reputation leverage when the downstream type is
unknown. A high-quality seller may not be willing to sell its product at the same price
o¤ered by a reputable downstream rm because there is a risk that the downstream rm
will not be able to deliver a high-quality nal product, and the sellers high quality may not
be revealed in the market. This implies that a non-reputable downstream rm may end up
paying a higher input price vis-à-vis a reputable rm.
As is typical in the signaling literature, we can consider three types of equilibria in the
input market facing the downstream rm whose type is unknown to the seller: pooling
8We can also endogenously eliminate this unreasonable equilibrium in an expanded model. To see this,
suppose that there are many other potential rms that can disguise themselves as downstream rms in our
model. Supppose that these rms with no capability have no outside option and can only produce a shoddy
product with a negligible cost. Then, each of these rms can easily devise a scheme with a low-quality
input supplier and sell a product that nobody buys. This is protable for the rms with no capability and
low-quality input suppliers if consumers always believe that the input is high-quality, but the failure is due
to the downstream rm, as the low-type supplier can then receive a future prot of (   cL).
9Later in Section 4.1, where we discuss entry barriers due to the disadvantage in reputation leverage, we
consider the possibility that a non-reputable downstream entrant is more e¢ cient.
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equilibrium, separating equilibrium, and semi-separating equilibrium. In the pooling equi-
librium, in which both types of the downstream rm o¤er the same price, the high-quality
downstream rm needs to compensate the upstream rms risk. In the separating equilib-
rium, the high-quality rm needs to pay a su¢ ciently high price to the upstream rm to
signal its type. Either way, the high-quality downstream rm without reputation ends up
paying a higher price than the reputable rm.
We rst consider a pooling equilibrium to illustrate the idea of the reputation advantage
in the input market and show that the same insight remains valid in the other types of
equilibria. In a pooling equilibrium, the seller cannot distinguish the high-type downstream
rm from the low type, and the downstream rm pays the same input price regardless of its
type. In such an equilibrium, the high-quality seller is willing to supply to the non-reputable
downstream rm (instead of selling directly to consumers) only if
(pNR   cH) + (   cH)  direct;
where pNR is the price o¤ered by a non-reputable downstream rm, and  =  + (1  )
denotes the ex ante probability that the nal product of the downstream rm of unknown
type will be of high quality. Note that the reputable rm, in contrast, can o¤er a price pR
such that
(pR   cH) + (   cH)  direct:
This implies that
pNR = pR +; where  = (1  )(   cH) = (1  )(1  ) (   cH):
In other words, a non-reputable downstream rm needs to pay a premium of  = (1  
)(1 ) ( cH), compared to a reputable downstream rm. The lower  and , the higher
the premium the downstream rm needs to pay.
For the sake of argument, we now focus on the case in which the equilibrium is a
separating one when the seller sells directly to consumers.10 Thus, we have direct = cL  
cH + (   cH). Then, the reputable downstream rm can acquire its input at the price of
10Other cases can be analyzed in a similar way.
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pR = cL. The input acquisition cost for the non-reputable rm is pNR = pR + = cL +.
For this to be an equilibrium input price for the downstream rm, the low type should
be willing to pay this price. This requires
  (pNR + C)
=   [cL + (1  )(1  ) (   cH) + C]  0:
This condition can be equivalently written as
   = C + cL + (1  )(   cH)
 + (1  )(   cH) : (6)
Lemma 1 For   , there exists a pooling equilibrium in which all types of the down-
stream rm participate in the market and pay the same input price of pNR = cL + (1  
)(1  ) (   cH). The input cost premium that the non-reputable downstream rm needs
to pay is given by  = (1  )(1  ) (   cH); which is decreasing in .
If condition (6) is not satised (i.e.,  < ), then there is no pooling equilibrium in
which both types participate and pay the same input price. When  < o = cL+C , the low
type cannot protably participate in the market, even if it can purchase the high-quality
input at the lowest possible price cL. Thus, any downstream rm that is willing to o¤er an
input price of cL must be of the high type. In this case, the non-reputable downstream rm
does not face any cost disadvantage vis-à-vis a reputable one. We return to this situation
when analyzing separating equilibria below.
When  2 [o; ), there exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which the low-type
downstream rm uses a mixed strategy of participating in the market with a positive prob-
ability of . Let  denote the probability that the participating downstream rm is low-type
when high-type always participates. Then, we have
 =
(1  )
 + (1  ) :
Note that (2 [0; ]) is increasing in . Then,  is implicitly determined by the following
condition:
 = cL + (1  ) (   cH) + C; where  = (1  )
 + (1  ) : (7)
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For  2 [o; ), the participation probability of the low-type downstream rm  is increasing
in . In this equilibrium, the input price is given by pNR = cL+(1 ) ( cH) =  C;
at this price, the low-type downstream rm is indi¤erent between participating and not
participating in the market. The premium that the non-reputable downstream rm pays
vis-à-vis a reputable one is given by  = (1  ) (   cH) =   [C + cL].
Lemma 2 For  2 [o; ), there exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which the high-
type downstream rm always participates, and the low-type downstream rm participates
with probability  dened by (7). The non-reputable downstream rm pays the input price
of pNR = cL + (1   ) (   cH) =    C. The input cost premium due to the lack of
reputation in the input market is given by  = (1  ) (   cH) =   [C + cL], which
is increasing in .
Finally, there is also a separating equilibrium in the input market. In the separating
equilibrium, the non-reputable high-type downstream rm would be willing to pay up to
( CE), whereas the low-type rm would be willing to pay only up to ( C). Thus, in a
separating equilibrium, the high-type rm can reveal its type by o¤ering a price of  C.
Note that this price is the same as the input price in the semi-separating equilibrium.
The only di¤erence is that in the separating equilibrium, only the high-type downstream
rm participates, whereas in the semi-separating equilibrium the low type participates with
positive probability. As a result, sellers prefer the equilibrium in which downstream rms
separate, while downstream rms are indi¤erent between the two types of equilibria. When 
is su¢ ciently high and close to 1 (more precisely, if  >  where  = C+cL+( cH)+( cH) > 
),
the cost of separation for the high type becomes too high and the separating equilibrium
fails to exist. We summarize and prove this in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For  2 [0; ]; there is a separating equilibrium. For  < o(= cL+CE ), the low
type does not participate in the market, and the high type pays a price of pNR = cL for the
input. For  > o, the high type signals its type by paying a price of pNR =   C(> cL),
and the input price premium due to a lack of reputation is given by  = (1 ) ( cH) =
  [C + cL]: For  > , there is no separating equilibrium.
Proof. The lowest price at which the high-type sellers are willing to sell to downstream
rms is cL. If  < o, participation is simply not protable for the low-type downstream
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rm. As a result, a downstream rm that is willing to o¤er a price of cL must be of the
high type. For  > o, the low-type downstream rm has incentives to participate with
an input price of cL. Therefore, for separation to take place, the high-type downstream
rm needs to o¤er a higher input price that would discourage the low-type rm to match.
Therefore, the high-type downstream rm needs to o¤er pNR =  C(> cL) when  > o.
However, if  is su¢ ciently large, it becomes too costly to separate, and the high-type rm
has incentives to deviate. To see this, suppose that a high-type downstream rm deviates
and does not o¤er the putative equilibrium price of pNR =    C. Then, in the worst
case, it will be conceived to be of low type. In such a case, the high-quality seller would be
willing to supply at a price of cL + (1   ) (   cH), which is lower than the equilibrium
price pNR when  > . Thus, a separating equilibrium does not exist when  > :
Taking all three lemmas above, we can conclude that for  < o, there is only a separating
equilibrium that is essentially the same as the full information equilibrium. Here, the non-
reputable downstream rm pays the same price as the reputable downstream rm. For
 2 [o; ), there are both separating and semi-separating equilibria. However, the input
price is the same across both types of equilibria. The only di¤erence is in terms of the
participation probability of a low-type non-reputable downstream rm. In the separating
equilibrium, the low type does not participate. In the semi-separating equilibrium, low-type
downstream rm participates with a positive probability. Sellers are better o¤ with this
alternative signaling channel in the separating equilibrium, whereas they are indi¤erent in
the semi-separating equilibrium. For  2 [; ), there are both pooling and separating
equilibria. However, downstream rms strictly prefer pooling equilibria. For  > , there
is only a pooling equilibrium. From the perspective of the downstream rmsprots, the
multiple equilibria issue arises only for the parameter region of  2 [; ): In this case, we
select the equilibrium that the downstream rm prefers (i.e., the pooling equilibrium). This
does not a¤ect any of our qualitative results because if the separating equilibrium is chosen,
our argument concerning the reputation advantage is strengthened. With this equilibrium
selection, we summarize our discussions above in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let  be the input acquisition cost premium that a non-reputable down-
stream rm needs to pay compared to a reputable one. There is no premium if  < o =
cL+C
 . The non-reputable downstream rm pays a premium of  =    [C + cL], which
is increasing in  for  2 [o; ). For   , the non-reputable downstream rm pays a
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premium of  = (1   )(1   ) (   cH), which is decreasing in : Thus, the premium is
non-monotonic in  and highest when  is at :
Figure 1 illustrates the input acquisition cost premium for a non-reputable downstream
rm as a function of .
Figure 1. Lack of Reputation and the Input Acquisition Cost Disadvantage
4 Applications and Extensions
In the previous section, we demonstrated how the reputation of the downstream rm vis-à-
vis input suppliers (i.e., whether it is known to be of high quality) a¤ects the price it pays
for the input. Our simple model has a several important applications, which we discuss
below.
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4.1 Competing downstream rms: A new theory of barriers to entry
In this subsection, we embed our mechanism in a model with potential downstream entry.
There is an incumbent (I) in the downstream market that is known to be of high type. The
high-type seller knows that by supplying to the high-type downstream rm, it can signal its
quality to consumers, and, thus, command a price of  in the second period. This implies
that the high-type seller is willing to supply to the reputable incumbent at any price higher
or equal to the price with which it can signal its quality. In other words, the incumbent
rm with a reputation is able to purchase the high-quality input at the price of pI = cL due
to its ability to certify the quality of the input. Let us assume that the incumbents cost of
production in addition to the input price is given by C:
There is a potential entrant (E) at the downstream stage who can decide to enter in
period 0 at cost ". The potential entrant, which can be either of the high type or the low
type, knows its type prior to entry, but its type remains private information. We denote by
 2 (0; 1) the a priori probability that the potential entrant is of high type. However, we
assume that once the downstream product is produced, consumers can ascertain its quality.
In other words, the entrants downstream product is an inspection good, as in the case of
the incumbent. If the potential entrant produces a high-quality product, it does not need
any introductory pricing to signal its quality and could command a price of  in the market,
when not competing with the incumbent. This means that the potential entrant does not
face any disadvantage vis-a-vis the incumbent due to uncertainty about the quality of its
own product. Thus, we rule out the entry barrier created by the presence of "hit-and-
run" entrants and abstract from the mechanism analyzed in Farrell (1986). The entrant at
the downstream stage will certainly face additional barriers to entry if the product is an
experience good.
To focus on the entrants disadvantage in the input market, we construct our model in
such a way that all other potential channels of entry barrier are blocked, and the entrant is
on a level playing eld with the incumbent. In this spirit, we also endow the entrant with
the same ability to ascertain the input quality as the incumbent. The potential entrant has
a production cost advantage of CE < C. This implies that a high-type potential entrant
is a more e¢ cient producer than the incumbent. In other words, absent the asymmetric
information problem that the potential entrant faces, the entrant enjoys a cost advantage
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when delivering the nal good to consumers. In this case, if the incumbent and the entrant
operate in the same homogeneous product market and compete in a Betrand fashion in the
product market, the high-type entrant will make a positive prot, while the incumbent will
make zero prot.
The entry barrier we identify in this model is the potential entrants disadvantage in the
input market. Can the potential entrant procure its input as cheaply as the incumbent? One
assumption we adopt is that the seller does not know the potential entrants type. Thus,
there is asymmetry in the information structure before and after the entrants production.
Once the entrant produces a nal product, its type can be revealed in the product market.
However, before production takes place, there is no way for the input supplier to ascertain
the entrants type or the quality of its product. We assume that a contract with the
potential entrant that is contingent on the realized nal product qualities is not feasible.
The inability to write a contingent contract can be justied by the problems of veriability
in courts (Hart and Grossman, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990).
Due to asymmetric information, as our analysis in Section 3 shows, even if the potential
entrant is more e¢ cient, the disadvantage in its procurement cost may put it at an overall
disadvantage if the input price premium it has to pay is high enough. In particular, when
the two types of the downstream rm pool, entry may be blocked if the input cost premium
the entrant has to pay is such that
 > (C   CE);
where  = (1   )(1   ) (   cH) (compare Figure 1). More generally, if the two
downstream rms o¤er di¤erentiated products, the entrant may enjoy a positive prot;
however, its disadvantage due to the input price premium it has to pay may limit the
entrants prots to such an extent that it cannot recover its entry costs. This provides a
novel theory of barriers to entry.
Our model, therefore, provides a novel and unexplored channel through which the in-
cumbency advantage can be obtained. Often, the incumbents cost advantage is attributed
to its ability to buy in bulk and to monopsonic power. For instance, Apples success and
its huge margin on its products are often attributed to its "big discounts on parts, manu-
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facturing capacity, and air freight" because of its volume and ruthlessness in bargaining.11
Our model suggests that another source of the low input price and its cost advantage can
be Apples ability to certify the quality of its input suppliers. Input suppliers can garner
instant credibility by being designated as an Apple supplier, and they are willing to supply
at a low price to establish themselves as a high-quality producer, which enables them to
receive high prices in the market down the road.
4.2 Outsourcing/O¤shoring Decision
One of the most important decisions in procurement and supply chain management is
a make-or-buy decision: what to produce internally and what to outsource. The usual
explanation for outsourcing is that the outside rms are simply more e¢ cient and produce
more cheaply. Some of the most cited benets of outsourcing include economies of scale, risk
pooling, and reduced capital investment. In particular, outsourcing allows a rm to focus on
its core competency and provides opportunities to reduce costs by relying on outsiders who
can aggregate multiple orders to reap the economies of scale (Simchi-Levi et al., 2008). Our
model provides an interesting twist in the outsourcing decision. In our model, outsourcing
can take place even when the rm is equally e¢ cient or even more e¢ cient than outsiders.
The reason is that the input supplier is willing to supply below its cost to signal its quality.
If the input supplier is less e¢ cient, outsourcing may well be socially ine¢ cient (compare
Section 3.3).
Consider the separating equilibrium when the input suppliers sell directly to consumers.
Then, the high-type input supplier needs to sell at the price of p1  cL to signal its quality.
For this signaling strategy to be viable, we assume that the high-type producer can recoup
its loss in the rst period with its second-period prot; that is, (   cH)  (cH   cL). In
addition, we assume that the downstream rm is able to produce a high-quality input more
e¢ ciently at a cost of (< cH).
Under such conditions, the downstream rms input acquisition cost is cL, while its
internal input acquisition cost is . As long as  > cL, the downstream rm would prefer to
engage in outsourcing, even though it can produce the input more e¢ ciently. This provides
a new rationale for outsourcing. In our model, outsourcing is a mechanism to extract rents
11See Satariano and Burrows (2011).
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from willing partners who are eager to receive a seal of approval from reputable rms. From
this, we can conclude that the rm plays a dual role of input purchaser and quality-certifying
intermediary.
We can derive qualitatively the same results when we analyze a pooling equilibrium or
consider a game in which consumers bid up the price of the product until the price equals
consumerswillingness to pay, as, for example, in Tadelis (1999) and Cabral (2000), among
others. If the pooling equilibrium prevails in the consumer market, the established rm
can acquire its input at the price of p1 = . With this modication, it can be easily
veried that all the remaining results hold, as in the separating equilibrium. In particular,
if cH >  > (> cL), the downstream rm has incentives to engage in outsourcing even
though it has the capability to produce as e¢ ciently as or more e¢ ciently than the outside
rm. It is cheaper to outsource at the price of  than to produce internally at the cost of
.
4.3 Dynamic Market Entry Strategy: From OEM to Brand Name
An OEM (original equipment manufacturer) is a rm that manufactures products or com-
ponents for other companies to resell or to incorporate into a product labeled under the
purchasing companys brand name. Many rms from East Asia start out as OEMs for major
rms and then later establish their own brand name. For instance, Samsung was initially
an OEM but is now considered one of the worlds leading brands in at-panel screens and
smartphones. In a similar vein, LG Electronics initially took OEM orders before establish-
ing its own global brand in the international market. Kia Motors served as an OEM for
Ford before selling cars under its own brand name overseas. Other examples include HTC,
Huawei, and Lenovo (formerly Legend).
Our model suggests that this type of strategy is more e¤ective when the OEM is from
a developing country. The usual explanation in the literature is that rms in developing
countries often lack technical capability and e¤ective production systems, which results in
the production of low-end and poor-quality products. OEM contract arrangements with
rms in advanced countries allow them to gain access to advanced production and techno-
logical skills, o¤ering a vehicle to enter foreign markets and upgrade their capabilities. This
process helps enhance the perceived quality and image of the OEMs products, which enables
them to eventually sell products under their own brand name (Cheng, et al., 2005). Gere¢
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(1999), for instance, provides a detailed analysis of the global apparel industry in which
he documents the instrumental role of branded marketers in upgrading overseas suppliers
technical and organizational capabilities. Our model provides an alternative mechanism
through which being an OEM can be an e¤ective strategy to enter foreign markets; even
when rms already have su¢ cient capability to produce high-quality products, and, thus,
no technical learning is involved, OEM contracts can be valuable in facilitating future en-
try with rmsown brand names by providing a "seal of approval" for consumers who are
uncertain about their capabilities to produce high-quality products.
To formally develop this idea, consider a situation in which introductory pricing to signal
quality is too costly, and, thus, there is no separating equilibrium. Once again, assume that
high quality has a production cost of cH , whereas low quality has a production cost of cL
with cH > cL. The high-quality input supplier needs to sell at the price of p1  cL to
signal its quality. If (   cH) < (cH   cL), the high-quality seller cannot recoup its loss
from introductory pricing in the future, and a separating equilibrium does not exist. In a
pooling equilibrium, consumers are willing to pay only up to . For a pooling equilibrium
to exist, it is required that   cL. Thus, a pooling equilibrium exists only when the a
priori probability of the high type, , is su¢ ciently high that is,    = cL= .
We can interpret  to reect the overall technical capability of rms in an economy,
with more advanced countries having a higher . If a rm is based in a less developed
country, consumers will associate the rm with a lower . Thus, if (   cH) < (cH   cL)
and  < , there is no way for a rm of unknown quality to directly enter the consumer
market. However, if there is an established rm that can purchase the product as an input,
the rm may be able to enter the market. As before, we assume that the established rm
can ascertain the quality of the product that can be used as an input. It can o¤er a price ofbp1 = cH  (   cH), which is, once again, lower than the cost of internal production, even
if the established rm is equally e¢ cient as the outside input suppliers.12
Therefore, established rms that are able to ascertain and indirectly certify the quality
of the OEM products can provide an alternative entry path for the supplying rm when
direct entry to consumer markets is not feasible. This is more likely to hold for rms from
developing countries and may explain why rms that make a transition from OEM to OBM
12 If the input supplier has any bargaining power, then the input acquisition price will be somewhere
between cH and cH  (   cH):
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(original brand manufacturers) are predominantly from developing countries. The price
path is also consistent with the evidence that original brand manufacturers receive much
higher margins compared to OEMs.13 The theory is also consistent with Ghosh and Johns
(2009) empirical nding that rms are more likely to choose branded component contracts
when the suppliers brand name adds signicant di¤erentiation.
Case studies of OEM rms that made successful transitions to OBMs also document
conicts with their customers when OEM rms cultivated their own brand names, with
OEM customers threatening to reduce or withdraw OEM contracts (Yang and Wu, 2008;
Cheng et al., 2005). This type of conict is often attributed to OEM clientsperception
of OEMs as potential competitors once they establish their own brands. In our model,
separation will take place even if there is no direct competition and the relationship is
purely vertical; after establishing a reputation via OEM relationships, OEMs do not see
any reason to supply at a low price when they are able to sell at a higher price in the open
market. From the perspective of OEM clients, the cost of purchasing through OEMs with
established reputations is simply too costly. Thus, the optimal strategy of OEM clients is
to nd another willing partner that needs to establish a reputation. Our model implies that
OEM clients will use a revolving list of OEMs.
4.4 Input as a scarce resource: The case of a single seller
Our analysis so far has applied to markets in which downstream rms can always nd high-
quality sellers as input suppliers, and the contracting between downstream rms and sellers
does not change the overall type composition of those sellers who sell directly. Formally,
this means that the fraction of sellers who sell through downstream rms is negligible.14
The other extreme is a situation in which all high-type input suppliers contract with a
downstream rms. To analyze such a situation, suppose that there is a single seller.
The equilibrium characterization in which only direct selling is available to the seller
remains unchanged. However, in the presence of a reputable downstream rm, our analysis
needs modication. Suppose that the parameter constellation is such that supplier types
pool under direct selling. In our analysis so far, the corresponding prot of the high type
13Yang and Wu (2008) quote Gerhand Schen, general manager of Mingde Musik in China, as saying "[I]n
the OEM business, you only get one-eighth of the pie, but with your own brand, you get a bigger chunk of
the prots."
14We briey commented on relaxing this assumption in the previous section.
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under direct selling has dened the outside option when contracting with a downstream rm.
This is no longer the case: if consumers held equilibrium beliefs of the pooling equilibrium
under direct selling also in the presence of a downstream rm, the high-type seller would
contract with the downstream rm, whereas the low-type seller would sell directly. Thus,
consumer beliefs are not conrmed because they expect the high type with prior probability
when buying directly from the seller, and there cannot be pooling of supplier types, when
the alternative channel is available. Hence, the outside option gives a prot weakly less
than direct.
Since a downstream rm may not encounter a high-quality supplier, the question arises
whether it would be willing to contract with a low-quality seller. Under our assumption
that low-quality input always leads to a low-quality nal product of the downstream rm,
this can never be the case. However, when we also relax this assumption and postulate that
low-quality input only reduces the probability that the nal product is high-quality, the
downstream rm may be tempted to accept a low-quality input, especially if the alternative
supply is very costly; i.e.,  large. If this were the case, consumers could no longer make
a perfect inference about seller type. Thus, the question arises how the downstream rm
can defend its reputation by refusing to contract with a low-quality seller and, instead,
source at cost . Following Choi (1998), one can extend the model to consider a discrete
time, innite horizon setting, in which the downstream rm sells a product in every period.
Along the equilibrium path, it rejects low-quality suppliers because consumers would no
longer trust the downstream rm and expect it to take in the seller of any type if, in the
past, the product had failed.15
Returning to our two-period model, when a reputable incumbent and a non-reputable
entrant downstream rm compete in the downstream market, they also compete to contract
for supply from the high-quality seller. Due to the lack of reputation, the high-type entrant
is at a disadvantage compared to the incumbent when bidding for the input. Therefore, the
incumbent will procure the input from the high-quality seller, whereas the entrant has to
procure from an alternative source at cost . Following the argument in Section 4.1, the
resulting input price premium that the entrant has to pay creates a barrier to entry. When
entry nevertheless takes place, our model predicts that incumbents prevail in the bidding
15This insight also applies to the setting with many sellers if the number of downstream rms exceeds the
number of high-quality sellers; i.e.,  > .
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for scarce inputs from non-established input suppliers, while non-reputed downstream rms
have to resort to alternative sources of supply.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed the idea that a rms customer relationships can signal the
quality of its product. A downstream rm can take advantage of this signaling mechanism
and utilize its reputation to procure inputs at a lower cost than it would have to pay to
procure it from a di¤erent rm known to be of high quality.
Embedded into a setting with downstream competition, a reputable downstream rm
is able to maintain the incumbency position even if the potential entrant lacking such a
reputation is more e¢ cient, thus creating an entry barrier. The incumbents advantage
comes from its ability to "certify" the quality of input suppliers if they are subject to
adverse selection due to uncertainty about the quality of their products. This provides
a new rationale for the incumbency advantage and the persistence of monopoly. We also
explored how the mechanism considered in the paper can be applied to other contexts, such
as outsourcing and dynamic entry strategies for unknown brand names.
The mechanism can also be applied to young scholarsincentives to work with established
scholars in their early careers. Choi and Jeon (2007) interpret the coauthoring relationship
between young and established scholars in terms of co-branding, in which coauthorship
with established scholars can be used to signal a young scholars ability. Of course, in
the setting of collaboration in the academic market, there is no monetary price associated
with the transactions. Instead, the division of the workload may replace the role of price
in the relationship. One implication of our model is that young scholars will be willing
to shoulder the bulk of work when they work with established scholars. In this sense,
established scholars have a signicant advantage vis-à-vis non-established ones in terms of
productivity, as the incumbent enjoys a cost advantage compared to potential entrants who
do not have an established reputation.16
16Zuckerman (1967, p. 396) quotes an unnamed Nobel laureate in physics: ".. it clearly did my student...
no harm at all to have me as a second author of the paper. It called peoples attention to the paper who
might otherwise not [have] read it at all... Nor as a matter of fact, did it do me any harm."
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